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1 
CHAPTER I 
                            
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
When a client asks his lawyer what his duties are under 
a particular contract, normally the lawyer’s first response 
is “show me the contract.” Does the contract provide all the 
contract duties in its expressed form? Definitely not. By 
now everyone acknowledges that, to some extent, all 
contracts have some gaps. Even the most carefully drafted 
document rests on volumes of assumptions that cannot be 
explicitly expressed.1 The inevitability of gaps reflects 
both our “relative ignorance of fact” and “our relative 
indeterminacy of aim.”2 Generally speaking, there are three 
types of gaps: first, the parties to a contract have not 
agreed upon a term; second, the parties have agreed upon a 
term, but the term itself is so vague that it is impossible 
to ascertain its meaning; and third, the parties have agreed 
                     
1
 See Arthus Rosett, Critical Reflection on the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, 45 Ohio St. L. J. 265, 287 (1984). 
2
 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 125 (1961). 
 2
to agree upon a term sometime after contract formation, but 
then never reach an agreement on that point. A remarkable 
 3
trend in modern contract law is the relaxation of the 
requirement of certainty of terms. Modern legislation and 
courts are willing to enforce contracts even where many 
terms are missing, including such seemingly essential terms 
as time of delivery and price.3 But once the courts relax 
the certainty requirement, they themselves must find a way 
to fill the gaps in the binding arrangements. 
 For centuries, “freedom of contract” has been the 
central, most celebrated principle of contract law. In 
general, “freedom of contract” means that the parties to a 
transaction are free, or “entitled” to agree on, or “to 
choose” any lawful terms. “Freedom of contract” implies that 
contractual obligation ultimately relies on the consent of 
the parties.  
However, the principle of “freedom of contract” has 
different meanings in response to the changing social 
situation. Accompanying the rise of the market economy and 
decline of belief in value objectivity, the principle of 
“freedom of contract” emerged early in the nineteenth 
century as a powerful symbol of individual autonomy and 
                     
3
 See UCC § 2-204(3); Restatemant (Second) Of Contracts §§ 
33, 34; Jean Braucher, Contract versus Contractarianism: The 
Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 697, 
723, 730-31 (1990); Donald B. King, Reshaping Contract 
Theory and law: Death of Contracts II Part One: Generalised 
Consent with Lawmade obligations, 7 J. Cont. L. 245 (1994). 
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community well-being.4 Early in this century, however,  
freedom of contract was considered as more “naive myth” than 
commonplace reality.5 By 1920 Samuel Williston recognized 
that “unlimited freedom of contract, like unlimited freedom 
in other directions, does not necessarily lead to public or 
individual welfare.”6 
Historically and today, the courts often say that they 
rely on the intentions of the parties in filling gaps. To 
the extent that a collective intention of the parties 
actually guides the gap-filling, then judicial gap-filler 
actually facilitates freedom of contract. It preserves 
contract as consent-based liability. To the extent that gap-
filling actually involves legislative or judicial design on 
the private agreement, it stands in tension with freedom of 
contract. This thesis seeks to review the modern development 
of gap-filling rules to define how significant the tension 
is between gap-filling and freedom of contract. Ultimately, 
it suggests that the gap-filling process requires adjustment 
                     
4
 See generally P. S. Atiyah, the Rise and Fall of Freedom 
of Contract 660-779 (1979); Grant Gilmore, The Death of 
Contract 103 (1974). 
5
 See generally Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles 
and Karl’s New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our 
New Commercial Law, 11 Vill. L. Rev. 213 (1966); Richard E. 
Speidel, the New Spirit of Contract, 2 J. L. & Com. 193 
(1982); Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and 
the ‘Rise and Fall’, 79 B. U. L. Rev. 263 (1999). 
6
 Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 Cornell L. Q. 
365, 374 (1921). 
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of our traditional understanding of freedom of contract. In 
fact, not all contractual obligations rest on the consent of 
the parties. Once the parties have chosen to enter a binding 
relationship and defined its broad outlines, the courts must 
creatively define the specifics of the relationship. 
 This thesis proceeds as follows: 
Chapter II states the origin and development of the 
gap-filling rules. In the development of the rules, the 
judicial approach moved from respecting the parties’ nominal 
freedom of contract to considering the parties’ actual 
intention and to realizing the parties’ reasonable 
expectations. Eventually, accumulated precedents formed a 
set of default rules that were later regulated by the 
contract law. 
 Chapter III examines the provisions in the Restatement, 
the Uniform Commercial Code and the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sales of Goods (hereinafter 
“CISG”). The Restatement (First), representing the 
traditional common law approach, requires a high degree of 
specificity in the essential terms of the contract. The 
Restatement (Second), UCC and CISG adopt more flexible 
approaches. The three laws provide “reasonable” standards 
for filling gaps left by the contracting parties.  
Chapter IV discusses two recent scholarly theories of 
gap-filling rules. Both theories emphasize the position of 
 6
good faith and reasonableness in the field of gap-filling. 
Professor Zamir proposed that, in some extent, good faith 
and reasonableness should be the first source when courts 
fill the gaps in the contracts. The theory of penalty 
default rules indicates that good faith and reasonableness, 
in some circumstances, may prevent the parties from leaving 
“bad faith” gaps in their contracts. 
Chapter V studies three leading cases in the field of 
gap-filling. Courts always prefer to fill the gaps in a 
reasonable and fair way so as to prevent the abuse of 
contractual freedom. Even before the advent of the Second 
Restatement and the UCC, courts already used good faith and 
reasonableness to supply a missing term in the contract so 
as to balance the freedom of contract and social values. 
Since the law imposed the general duty of the good faith, 
the courts have used it as a tool to realize the reasonable 
intentions of the parties and contractual justice. 
Chapter VI serves as the conclusion. It argues that the 
relationship between gap filling and freedom of contract is 
complex. At times gap filling supports freedom of contract 
by allowing the parties to conclude a binding agreement 
without specifying all of the terms of the relationship. 
Gap-filling guarantees efficiency in that it allows for 
generalized agreements. In addition, gap-filling raising 
contemporary standards of fair dealing and reasonableness 
 7
may often reflect what the parties to generalized agreements 
intend at the time of contracting. The tension between 
judicial gap filling and freedom to specify one’s own 
agreement is greatest at the point when the courts actually 
supply the content which the parties omitted. At this point 
of judicial intervention we must recognize that freedom of 
contract is not absolute but must at times give way to the 
demands of fairness. 
8 
CHAPTER II 
                            
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF GAP-FILLING RULES 
 
 The traditional common-law approach to gaps is that a 
court should not “make the contract for the parties.” 7 The 
courts have adopted different practices to perform this 
approach. The process can be divided into three stages in 
the origin and development of gap-filling.8 Warranties and 
impossibility are taken as examples to trace the historical 
evolution of gap-filling rules. 
 
1. Strict Literalism: The Parties to the Contract Enjoyed 
Entire Freedom of Contract. 
England courts in the seventeenth century, with the 
characteristic of strict literalism, regarded the agreement 
of the parties as an exclusive source for performance and 
interpretation, thereby they confined themselves to the bare 
                     
7
 “The court will not write contracts for the parties to 
them nor construe them other than in accordance with the 
plain and literal meaning of the language used.” Henrietta 
Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 F. 2d. 931, 934 (4th Cir. 
1931). 
8
 See E. A. Farnsworth, Omission in Contracts, 68 Colum. L. 
R. 860, 862(1968). This chapter relies principally on this 
important article by Professor Farnsworth. 
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framework provided by the parties through their contract 
language.9 In light of this premise, courts would not fill 
any gaps left by the parties. In this sense, the parties to 
the contract enjoyed the entire freedom of contract and took 
the full responsibility for providing the content of their 
contract. In the sales contract, if a seller made a promise 
to sell goods unaccompanied by an express warranty, the 
principle was “caveat emptor (let the buyer beware).” In the 
leading case of Chandelor v. Lopes, the buyer alleged that a 
stone purchased from the seller jeweler was misrepresented 
as a bezar-stone. The court held: “[T]he bare affirmation 
that it was bezar-stone, without warranting it be so, is no 
cause of action; and although he knew it to be no bezar-
stone, it is not material;  for every one in selling his 
wares will affirm that his wares are good …, yet if he does 
not warrant them to be so, it is no cause of action.”10 
Similarly, a person’s obligation to perform under a contract 
was not excused by impossibility of performance. Suppose, 
for instance, seller agreed to sell buyer a quantity of 
goods, but failed to condition his promise.  Before 
delivery, the occurrence of some un-provided for event (like 
outbreak of war, a natural disaster, or a change in the law) 
made seller’s performance impossible. A court would still 
                     
9
 See Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 863. 
10
 79 Eng. Rep. 3, 4 (Ex. Cham. 1603). 
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hold seller responsible for damages despite the disastrous 
event, on the ground that parties should be held to the term 
of their contract. This doctrine was expressed in the 
medieval maxim reservenda sunt pacta - an agreement must be 
kept though the heavens fall.11 
 
2. Actual Intention of the Parties: Subjective 
Standards for Filling Gaps 
 By the Nineteenth Century English courts played a more 
active role when confronted with gaps. Their approach became 
more flexible and more liberal. Even though the courts still 
proclaimed the principle that the contract of the parties 
remained the exclusive source for the performance, they 
began to go beyond the contract language provided by the 
parties and fill gaps with what they thought to be the 
actual expectations of the parties. Therefore, the judicial 
decisions were annouced in the name of the parties, by 
claiming that the result was based on the actual intention 
of the parties implied in the contract.12 The content of the 
contract not only existed in the expressed terms, but also 
in the parties’ intention behind the expressed terms. 
                     
11
 See Michael G. Rapsomanikis, Frustration of Contract in 
International Trade Law and Comparative Law, 18 Duq. L. Rev. 
551, 551 (1980). 
12
 See Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 863. 
 11
 The decisive case in the warranties area was Jones v. 
Bright13. In Jones, the buyer told the seller what he needed 
and the seller remarked, “we will supply him well.” The 
court held that this assurance was tantamount to an express 
warranty that the goods would be fit for the purpose. The 
majority of the court went even further to establish a 
general rule of implied warranty. The court stated that it 
would “put the case on the broad principle - if a man sells 
an article, he thereby warrants that it is merchantable, 
that it is for some purpose.”14 Later, Jones v. Just clearly 
stated that this implied warranty of merchantability was 
believed to be the intention of the parties.15 
 The doctrine of impossibility was laid down in Taylor 
v. Caldwell.16 In Taylor, the lessee contracted to hire the 
lessor’s music hall for a series of concerts. After the 
signing of the contract, but six days before the first 
contract, the hall was destroyed by fire. The court held 
that the lessor was discharged from performing and that his 
failure to perform was therefore not a breach of contract. 
This conclusion was based on the theory that the parties 
                     
13
 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (Ex. Cham 1829). 
14
 Id. at 1172. 
15
 Because “it must be assumed that the buyer and seller 
both contemplated a dealing in an article which was 
merchantable.” L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 207 (1868). 
16
 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863). 
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regarded the continued existence of the hall as the 
“foundation” of the contract, and that the contract 
contained an “implied condition” that both parties would be 
excused if the hall ceased to exist. The reason given for 
the principle was that it carried out the intent of the 
parties.17 
 
3. Reasonable Expectations of the Parties: Objective 
Standards for Filling the Gap. 
The search for actual intention gradually gave way to 
the implication of terms through the reasonable person of 
the objective theory. In this stage, the court began to fill 
the gap with the objective intention of the parties rather 
than the subjective intention of the parties. Court began 
openly to go beyond the parties actual expectations as well 
as their contract language and fill in the gap with what the 
judges themselves thought was fair or reasonable.18 As 
Learned Hand wrote, “As courts become increasingly sure of 
themselves, interpretation more and more involves an 
imaginative projection of the expressed purpose upon 
                     
17
 “There seems little doubt that this implication tends to 
further the great object of making the legal construction 
such as to fulfill the intention of those who entered into 
the contract. For in the course of affairs men in making 
such contracts in general would, if it were brought to their 
minds, say that there should be such a condition.” Taylor, 
supra note 16, at 312. 
18
 See Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 864. 
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situations arising later, for which the parties did not 
provide and which they did not have in mind.”19  
As courts relied less on the “intention” of the parties 
and took more responsibility upon themselves, the precedents  
came to provide ready-made terms for filling gaps. The terms 
supplied by the law were no longer considered to be based on 
the “intention” of the parties, but visualized instead as 
suppletive rules of law.20 These suppletive rules were 
stated as the reasonable intention of the parties. As early 
as in 1893, the warranties of fitness and merchantability 
went into the English Sale of Goods Act as suppletive rules 
of law. The Uniform Sales Act, patterned after the English 
Sales of Good Act, incorporated the substance of the Jones 
decision and imposed the contractual duty upon the seller. 
The Act provided that: “ Where the goods are brought by 
description from a seller who deals with in goods of that 
description, whether he be the grower or the manufacturer or 
not, there is an implied warranty that the goods should be 
of merchantable quality.”21 Finally, the law of implied 
warranty was recodified in the Uniform Commercial Code.22 
                     
19
 L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Royal Norwegian Government, 177 
F.2d 694, 702 (2d Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion), cert. 
denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950). 
20
 See Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 865. 
21
 § 15. 
22
 See UCC §§, 2-313, 2-314, 2-315. 
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According to the draftsmen of the UCC, the implied 
warranties relied on a “common factual situation or set of 
condition” and apply “unless unmistakenly negated.”23  
Similarly, the Restatement stated the rules on 
impossibility as a suppletive rule. These rules would apply 
“unless a contrary intention has been manifested.”24 A 
similar suppletive provision can be found in the UCC.25 
Finally, the agreement of the parties was admitted not to be 
the exclusive source of their obligations, but only the 
source to be deferred to when their intent was clearly 
established.  
In fact, contemporary scholarship regards most of the 
rules  of the  law  of contracts  as  gap-filling  rules  or 
                     
23
 UCC § 2-313, Comment 1. 
24
 Restatement Of Contracts § 457 (1932). 
25
 See UCC § 2-615. 
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“default rules”26 which are implied terms of a contract 
unless the contracting parties explicitly agree to vary 
them. The development of the gap-filling rules represents a 
gradual accumulation of such rules. 
                     
26
 In recent years it has become popular in academic world 
to refer to a gap-filling rule as “default rule,” a term 
borrowed from computer terminology. See E. Allan Farnsworth 
& William F. Young, Contracts: Cases and Materials (5th ed. 
1992), 612, Note 2.  
16 
CHAPTER III 
      
LAWS ON THE GAPS 
 
1. The Restatement and the Problem of Definiteness 
Based on the traditional common law doctrine, the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts, promulgated in 1932, 
purported to demand a high degree of specificity in the 
essential terms of the contract. According to the Reporter 
of the first Restatement – Professor Samuel Williston, “ an 
agreement in order to be binding, must be sufficiently 
definite to enable a court to give it an exact meaning.”27 
The Restatement provided that an offer “must be so definite 
in its terms, or require such definite terms in the 
acceptance, that the promises and performance to be rendered 
by each party are reasonably certain.”28 The commentary 
explained that because “the law of contracts deals only with 
duties by the expressions of the parties, the rule ... is 
one of necessity as well as of law.”29 A famous case decided 
                     
27
 1 S. Williston, Contracts, § 37(1920). 
28
 Restatement Of Contracts § 32 (1932). 
29
 Id., Comment a. 
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nine years before the Restatement illustrates this approach 
to definiteness. 
In Sun Printing and Publishing Assn. v. Remington Paper 
& Power Co.30, Inc., seller and buyer entered into a 
contract for the sale of newsprint. The contract provided 
that 1,000 tons of newsprint would be delivered each month 
for the next sixteen months. The contract specified the 
price per ton for each of the first four month of the 
contract. After this four month period, the contract 
provided, “The price of the paper ... shall be agreed upon 
by and between the parties ... said price in no event to be 
higher than the contract price for newsprint charged by the 
Canadian Export Paper Company.”31 Near the end of the four-
month period, the seller asserted that the contract was void 
for indefiniteness, and refused buyer’s demand for 1,000 
tons of paper at the Canadian Export Paper Company’s price.  
The New York Court of Appeals held that the contract failed 
for indefiniteness. While it was true the buyer had an 
assurance under the agreement that his price would not be 
any greater than the Canadian Export Paper Company price, 
the agreement did not specify how fluctuation in the 
Canadian price was to affect the contract price. It was not 
clear under the agreement whether the buyer and seller were 
                     
30
 235 N.Y. 338 (1923). 
31
 Id. at 342. 
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to agree on a new price every month, each time to be limited 
by the Canadian price then current, or whether they were to 
set one price at the beginning of the fifth month, to carry 
through to the rest of the contract. Because of this 
indefiniteness with respect to time-for-calculation, the 
contract was held to be fatally indefinite.32 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts took a different 
approach to gap-filling. According to its Reporter, Section 
204, entitled “Supplying An Omitted Essential Term” is “new” 
to the Restatement Second.33 It provides: “When the parties 
to a bargain sufficiently defined to be contract have not 
agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a 
determination of their rights and duties, a term which is 
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.”34 
Since the UCC had a substantial influence on the Restatement 
                     
32
 See Sun Printing, supra note 30, at 350-52. 
33
 Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 204, Reporter’s Note 
(1979). Even though the Restatement(First) adopted the 
strict approach dealing with the gap left by the parties, it 
still provided some gap-filling rules. For example, the 
provisions of impossibility are one of gap-filling rules. 
The provisions will be applied to discharge a party from 
performance when the parties themselves did not provide the 
events that would render performance impossible. Limitation 
on the damages is another gap-filling rules. For detailed 
discussion, see supra Chapter III, part 3.  
34
 Restatement(Second) Of Contracts § 204 (1979). 
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second in the gap-filling provisions,35 we are to consider 
the UCC’s provisions in solving the problem of gaps. 
 
2. The Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 2 of the UCC which applies to contracts for the 
sale of goods has led the way for gap filling. Section 2-204 
sets the stage by dispensing the rigid rules of offer and 
acceptance contained in the first Restatement.36 It 
provides: “Even though one or more terms are left open a 
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the 
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a 
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy.”37 Under this provision, the court is authorized to 
fill a number of gaps if the parties have left them open in 
their sales contract. The underlying policy is that an 
agreement for the sale of goods ought to be binding when the 
commercial parties regard it to be binding and that in 
practice both parties frequently believe that they are bound 
even though some terms have been left open. Gap-filling 
provisions are based on the assumption that these are the 
terms that most parties would have agreed to if they had 
                     
35
 See Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms 
and Contract Method, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 785, 792 (1982). 
36
 See generally Mooney, supra note 5. 
37
 UCC § 2-204(3). 
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focused on the issues in advance. In particular, the UCC 
provides instructions for filling gaps in price, place for 
delivery, time for shipment or delivery, time for payment. 
2.1. Particular Gap-Filling Rules in the UCC 
2.1.1. Open Price Term 
Section 2-305(1) provides for filling a missing price 
term. It provides, ”the parties if they so intend can 
conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not 
settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at 
the time for delivery …”38  The price must be fixed in good 
faith which must be in conformity with reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade if the party is a 
merchant. Usually a “posted price” or a future seller’s or 
buyer’s “given price,” “price in effect,” “market price,” or 
the like will be the reasonable price.39 If the Sun Printing 
case were decided according to the provisions of the UCC, it 
is most likely that the court would conclude that the 
parties intended to be bound. Evidence of such intent rests 
in details and performance.  
Under the UCC it is critical that the parties intend to 
be bound before a contract exists. Section 2-305(4) states, 
“where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless 
                     
38
 UCC § 2-305(1). 
39
 UCC § 2-305(1), Comment 3. 
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the price be fixed or agreed and it is fixed or agreed there 
is no contract.”40 
2.1.2. Absence of Specified Place for Delivery  
According to the UCC, if the parties do not specify 
where the goods are to be delivered, the place for delivery 
is the seller’s place of business, or if he has none, his 
residence.41 The only exception to this rule is that, at the 
time of contracting, if the goods are known by the parties 
to be somewhere other than at the seller’s business or 
residence, that place is the place of delivery.42 In other 
words, there the contract is silent, the court will construe 
the contract so as to require the buyer to take delivery at 
either the seller’s location or where the goods are located. 
The buyer must bargain to place a delivery obligation on the 
seller. 
2.1.3. Absence of Specific Time Provisions 
If the contract is silent as to the time for shipment, 
for delivery, or for any other action under the contract, 
that time shall be “a reasonable time”.43 A reasonable time 
                     
40
 UCC § 2-305(4). 
41
 See id. 2-308(a). 
42
 See id. 2-308(b). 
43
 See id. 2-309. 
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for taking any action usually relies on the nature, purpose 
and circumstances of the action to be taken.44 
2.1.4. Open Time for Payment or Running of Credit 
If the contract does not specify whether the buyer is 
to have credit, payment is due at the time and place at 
which the buyer is to receive the goods, even if this place 
is the seller’s place of business. Unless otherwise agreed, 
delivery and payment are concurrent conditions. In other 
words, the buyer is not entitled to credit unless the 
contract says so.45 
In Southwest Engineering Co. v. Martin Tractor Co.,46 
the defendant agreed to sell a generator to the plaintiff 
for a certain price. The two parties did not come to any 
explicit agreement on whether or not the machine was to be 
paid for in full upon delivery. The defendant refused to 
deliver, claiming that the absence of any agreement on 
payment terms made the contract invalid for indefiniteness. 
The court held that the contract was enforceable. Even the 
absence of a fairly important term does not necessarily make 
a contract fatally indefinite.  There are two reasons why 
absence of a payment clause was not fatal in Southwest 
Engineering: (1) UCC § 2-305(1) fills this gap (by requiring 
                     
44
 See UCC § 2-309 Comment 1. See also UCC § 1-204(2). 
45
 See id. 2-310(a). 
46
 473 P. 2d 18 (Kan. 1970). 
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payment on delivery); and (2) for more than four months 
after the defendant repudiated the contract, it did not even 
list lack of a payment clause as the reason why the contract 
was unenforceable, indicating that it did not attach too 
much importance to this absence. 
The gap-filling rules in the UCC are far more than the 
above provisions. In fact, most of the provisions in Article 
2 are gap-filling rules because these rules imply the 
contract terms when the parties to the contract have not 
reached on agreement on such terms.47 
2.2. Requirements Contracts 
A requirements contract gives the buyer discretion in 
determining the quantity of goods to be purchased. In this 
instance, the parties foresaw that, at the time of delivery, 
a specific quantity would have to be named. The parties, 
however, did not find it practicable or desirable to make 
those decisions when the contract was formed. Earlier cases, 
especially ones decided before the advent of the UCC, 
frequently held that such requirements contracts were 
invalid for lack of consideration (as well as for 
indefiniteness). In this circumstance, the court’s theory 
was that although the seller had undergone detriment by 
                     
47
 Besides the above provisions, some provisions in Article 
2 of the UCC contains the language “unless otherwise agreed” 
or comparable language, therefore fall into the category of 
gap-filling rules, e.g., see UCC §§ 2-210, 2-319 to 327, 2-503 
to 504, 2-507, 2-511, 2-513 to 514, 2-601, 2-706. 
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promising to sell at a particular price whatever the buyer 
required, the buyer had not in fact bound himself to do 
anything at all because he could refrain from having any 
requirements.48  
The UCC explicitly validates requirements contracts. 
UCC § 2-306 provides that “a term which measures the 
quantity by ... the requirements of the buyer means such 
actual ... requirements as may occur in good faith, except 
that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated 
estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any 
normal or otherwise comparable prior ... requirements may be 
... demanded.” Comment 2 to this section states that such 
contracts do not “lack mutuality of obligation since under 
this section, the party who will determine quantity is 
required to operate his plant or conduct his business in 
good faith and according to commercial standards of fair 
dealing in the trade so that his ... requirements will 
approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure.” 
UCC § 2-306 apparently contemplates that the buyer in a 
requirements contract will deal exclusively with the seller 
with whom has contracted. In other word, the buyer must 
promise that he will buy all of his requirements from that 
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 See e.g. Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper’s Glue 
Factory, 231 N. Y. 459 (1921) (the defendant who had agreed 
to supply all the plaintiff’s glue offers at 9 cents per 
pound, was released when the market price hit 24 cents and 
the plaintiff’s orders quintupled). 
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particular seller. This promise, coupled with the buyer’s 
good faith obligation to order quantities constitutes 
consideration for the seller’s counter-promise to meet the 
buyer’s needs. When a change in market condition makes it 
highly advantageous for a requirements buyer to increase his 
requirements sharply, the UCC does not permit such abuse of 
the contract. This is especially true where the buyer uses 
the extra purchases to speculate, rather than using them in 
the ordinary course of his business, such sharply increased 
requirements could be invalid either under the buyer’s duty 
to purchase in “good faith” or as being “unreasonably 
disproportionate” to any normal or otherwise comparable 
prior requirements.49 Obviously, the UCC fills the open 
quantity term with the reasonableness principle. 
2.3 What Kind of Gap Can Not Be Filled by the UCC? 
According to the Report of the Study Group of the 
Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC, Article 2 of the UCC 
may impose obligations on the parties whose agreement has 
gaps. The provisions of Article 2 are flexible and the 
standards “depend on (a) what the parties intended or (b) 
what they would have intended if they had considered it.” 
But, how much of an agreement must be reached before a 
contract exists? That is, what kind of gap can not be filled 
by the UCC? According to the Study Committee, the UCC has no 
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 See UCC § 2-306(1). 
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direct answer to the question.50 Under its provisions, the 
only term must appear in the contract is the quantity term 
that need not be accurately stated but must provide the 
basis for the recovery.51 
 
3. The United Nations Convention on the International 
Sales of Goods 
The approach of the CISG in gap-filling rules is 
similar to that of the UCC. The most distinctive provision 
is that the CISG clearly provides what constitutes a 
definite offer. “A proposal for concluding a contract ... 
constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and 
indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case 
of acceptance. A proposal is sufficiently definite if it 
indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly the quantity 
and the price.” 52 In other words, if an agreement provides 
the subject matter and the basis for determining the 
quantity and the price, there is a contract provided the 
                     
50
 Preliminary Report of the Study Group of Permanent 
Editorial Board for the UCC released on March 1, 1990, 11-
12. 
51
 “A writing is not insufficient because it omits or 
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is 
not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of 
goods shown in such writing.” UCC § 2-201(1). See also UCC § 
2-201, Comment 1. 
52
 CISG, Art. 14(1). 
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parties intend to be bound. Because Article 55 provides that 
open price term can be filled by “the price  
generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract for such goods sold under comparable circumstances 
in the trade concerned”,53 the provisions of the CISG imply 
that only the subject matter and quantity cannot be filled 
by the gap-filling rules. A purported offer which omits the 
two terms is not an effective offer. 
Like the UCC, the CISG provides many gap-filling rules. 
Those rules seem familiar and, in some extent, more abstract 
as the CISG applies to countries of different legal, social 
and economic system. In case of open price, the CISG fills 
the gap with the price generally charged at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract for similar transaction,54 in 
other word, market price. For absence of specified place for 
delivery, the CISG’s provisions are different from that of 
the UCC. The CISG imposes the obligation on the seller to 
hand the goods over to the first carrier for transmission to 
the buyer or place the goods “at the buyer’s disposal at the 
place where the seller had his place of business at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract.”55 This difference 
between the two laws is mainly because the CISG applies to 
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 CISG, Art. 55. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. Art. 31. 
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contracts of sales of goods between parties whose places of 
business are in different countries.56 The gap-filling rule 
in such a circumstance involves a more complicated  handing-
over procedure. For absence of specified time for shipment, 
the CISG’s provisions are almost the same as that of the 
UCC. That is, the delivery must be “within a reasonable time 
after the conclusion of the contract.”57 For the question of 
open time for payment, we find another quite similar 
provisions in the CISG. That is, delivery and payment are 
concurrent conditions.58  
Besides providing the particular gap-filling rules, the 
CISG regulates the hierarchy for gap-filling rules. The 
first one used to fill the gap is the parties’ intent, the 
second one is the “understanding of a reasonable person, the 
last is "all relevant circumstances of the case including 
the negotiations, any practices which parties have 
established between themselves, usages and any subsequent 
conduct of the parties."59 
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 CISG, Art. 1(1). 
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 Id. Art. 33(c). 
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 See id. Art. 58(1), “The seller may make such payment a 
condition for handing over the goods or documents.” 
59
 Id. Art. 8. This article is provided in the name of 
interpretation. It also applies to gap-filling.  
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4. Summary of Evolution 
The historical evolution of gap-filling rules indicates 
that emphasis has been gradually moving from protecting the 
parties’ private will to realizing the fair and reasonable 
meaning of the contract. At the beginning, the strict 
literalism approach strictly protected nominal freedom of 
contract. Nevertheless, sometimes the expectations of the 
parties were denied merely because they failed to make one 
term of the contract explicit. Realizing this, the courts 
relaxed their strict approach. When the parties intend to 
conclude a bargain, even though the contract is incomplete, 
the court will not deny the existence of the contract only 
if there is the basis for enforcement.  “A transaction is 
complete when the parties mean it be complete.”60 The court 
will make great effort to find out what is the intention of 
the parties thereby realize the intention (freedom) of the 
parties. “Many a gap in terms … can be filled, and shall be, 
with the result that is consistent with what the parties 
said and that is more just to both than would be refusal of 
enforcement.”61 On the one hand, the term supplied by the 
court or imposed by the law can be said to violate the 
principle of freedom of contract because it imposes a 
specific term which one or more of the parties did not agree 
                     
60
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to and would not have agreed to if they had focused on the 
specific issue. What the law recognizes as a reasonable or 
good faith specification may in fact be unacceptable to one 
or more of the parties. On the other hand, the evolution of 
gap-filling can be said to respect the freedom of contract 
to the maximum degree is that the courts try their best not 
to deny the parties’ intention to conclude a contract. 
Modern development of laws on gap-filling rules  
indicates that the legal system is ready to undertake the 
role of filling the gaps, that is, determining much of the 
contract’s content. The standard of filling the gaps is 
“good faith and reasonableness,” which is usually understood 
as the reasonable expectation of the parties.62 This 
development raises such a question: with the development of 
gap-filling rules, will freedom of contract survive as the 
central principle of contract?  
 
5. The Definition of Good Faith and Reasonableness 
Without doubt, good faith and reasonableness is 
established as a general principle of contract law by both 
the UCC and the Restatement. Even though good faith and 
reasonableness has potential for widespread application to 
gap-filling cases, because the principle is amorphous, some 
commentators argued that this principle is too vague to be 
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helpful to either party or even to the court.63 We have to 
admit that, even though the law clearly provides the 
principle, the law itself does not provide a clear formula 
to inform the court’s discretion.  
The Restatement (Second) of Contract § 205 provides 
that, “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement.” Its comment further indicates that good faith 
“emphasized faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and 
consistency with the justified expectations of the other 
party.”64 
The UCC expressly “imposes an obligation of good faith 
in its performance or enforcement” on every contract and 
duty within its scope.65 The Code gives two definitions of 
good faith. In the introductory Article 1, good faith “means 
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”66 
However, this definition is displaced in Articles 2, 3, 4, 8 
and Revised Article 9, where the Code provides a special 
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 See Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of 
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(1981). 
65
 See UCC § 1-203 (1987). 
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good faith standard in these articles. “Good faith” “means 
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade.”67  
At the broadest level, it is agreed that the principle 
imports an obligation “to preserve the spirit of the bargain 
rather than the letter, the adherence to substance rather 
than form,”68 or that the principle exists to “protect the 
reasonable expectations” of the contracting parties,69 but 
it is still not clear from its provisions the extent to 
which “honest” encompasses fairness, decency, reasonableness 
and similar values.  
Professor Farnsworth suggested an answer to this 
unclear condition based on the UCC’s comment:” part of the 
strength of such general concepts as ‘good faith’ and 
‘commercial reasonableness’ lies in an elasticity and lack 
of precision that permits them to be, in the language of the 
Code’s own comments, ‘developed by the courts in the light 
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 UCC § 2-103 (1)(b); § 3-103(a)(4); § 4-104(b); § 4A-
105(a)(6); § 8-102(a)(10); § 9-102(a)(43). 
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 Corbin on Contracts § 654A (C. Kaufman, 1989 West Supp.) 
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 See id. § 654D (B); E. A. Farnsworth, Good Faith 
Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform 
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of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.’”70 This 
idea is joined by Professor Summers. He suggested that good 
faith does not and in fact ought not contain a clear formula 
to guide a court’s discretion in applying the covenant. 
Rather, the principle is best thought of as an ‘excluder”, 
giving courts a license to judicially developed rules that 
prohibit actions that are taken in bad faith.71 
The position advanced by Professors Farnsworth and 
Summers are supported by the evolution of gap-filling rules. 
The historical evolution of the gap-filling rules shows the 
role of this elastic principle in the gap-filling rules. The 
nature of the good faith requirement explains the vagueness 
of the principle. With it, the courts have a tool to fill 
the gap so as to ensure the parties’ freedom in making 
contracts. Moreover, the principle of good faith and 
reasonableness can be used to reshape the existing default 
rules in response to the changing societal conditions based 
on the reasonable standard. For example, as a default rule, 
the rule that a sales agreement without a quantity term 
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would not be enforced has long been recognized. This rule 
was adjusted by adding “requirements contract rule” based on 
the reasonable standard.  
35 
CHAPTER IV 
                            
SCHOLARLY ANALYSES OF GAP-FILLING 
 
As recently as 1970, two commentators indicated that 
the question whether there was a general duty of good faith 
imposed upon the parties to a contract under our system of 
law has been almost entirely neglected in the legal 
literature.72 That statement no longer holds true. The idea 
of contractual good faith has been the subject of extensive 
scholarly examination.73 Moreover, the duty of good faith in 
performance and enforcement, recognized by both the UCC and 
the Restatement, has become a general principle of American 
contract law74 and influences many aspects of contract 
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law,75 including the gap-filling rules. In this chapter, we 
are to study two theories proposed in recent years with 
respect to the function of the principle of good faith and 
reasonableness in the field of gap-filling. 
 
1. Zamir’s Hierarchy of Gap-Filling  Rules 
1.1 Conventional Hierarchy of Gap-Filling Rules 
According to Professor Zamir, gap-filling is conceived 
of a multistage process, in which a variety of sources and 
means are turned to sequentially. These sources and means 
are considered to form the hierarchy of gap-filling rules. 
According to the traditional hierarchy, the intentions of 
the parties are to be deduced from the totality of the 
contract documents; secondly from the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the contract; and thirdly from 
course of performance, course of dealing and trade usage. If 
all these above sources and means are not useful, the 
default rules will be applied. If there is no definite 
answer in the ready-made default rules, general principles 
of contract law, such as good faith or reasonableness may be 
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 See UCC §§ 1-201, 1-203, 2-103(1)(b); Restatement (Second) 
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Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in 
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consulted.76 As one proceeds down the hierarchy, the level 
of generality and abstraction of the sources increases: 
first comes the specific transaction, followed by the 
totality of transactions made between the same parties, 
trade usage, legal rules applicable to similar contracts, 
general rules of contract law, and finally, the general 
standard of reasonableness. In a word, the gap-filling rule 
is that the parties’ specific intentions prevail if there is 
inconsistency between the parties’ own intention and general 
or reasonable intention.  
Even in the same layer of the hierarchy, such as course 
of performance, course of dealing and trade usage, there is 
still a movement from the specific transaction to general 
transaction. A course of performance exists where a contract 
involves repeated occasions for performance and a certain 
manner of performance is accepted without objection by the 
other party (thus indicating the parties’ specific 
understanding of the contract’s meaning.)77 A course of 
dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the same 
parties, which is established a common basis of 
understanding for interpreting their current expressions and 
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208(1); Stephen Charles, Interpretation of Ambiguous 
Contracts by Reference to Subsequent Conduct, 4 J. Cont. L. 
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other conduct.78 A usage of trade is a practice or method of 
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, 
vocation, or trade, as to give rise to an expectation that 
it will also be observed in a particular transaction.79 A 
course of performance is given greater weight than an 
inconsistent course of dealing, which in turn is given 
greater weight than an inconsistent usage of trade.80 
This hierarchy reveals an order for resorting to the 
different sources, when filling the gaps in the contract, a 
court should not turn to any “inferior” source before 
exhausting all the “superior” one. This hierarchy also 
implies that the preference among sources prevails in case 
there is inconsistency between the different sources.81  
According to Professor Zamir, this conventional 
hierarchy is based on the principle of freedom of contract 
and its underlying political-legal ideologies.82 The 
ideologies have two origins: the liberal-individualistic 
moral ideology and the utilitarian-economic ideology. 
According to liberalism, every person is the best judge of 
his own goals, and of the means by which they are to be 
                     
78
 See UCC § 1-205(1). 
79
 See UCC § 1-205(2). 
80
 See Restatement of Contract § 203 (b). 
81
 See Zamir, supra note 73, at 1718. 
82
 See Zamir, supra note 73, at 1768-69.  
 39
achieved. Society should respect the freedom of every 
individual and refrain from interfering with the outcome of 
free negotiations between the parties. Private will is the 
source of and the standard for the rights and obligations in 
a contract. Respecting freedom of individuals requires 
recognition of their power to conclude contracts and 
undertake obligations. The role of the law is to give effect 
to the contracts and obligations. As long as the contracting 
process is neither affected by defects such as coercion or 
misrepresentation nor subject to a few exceptions of 
illegality and public policy, the law should not interfere 
with the content of the rights and obligations that the 
parties have voluntarily undertaken.83 Freedom of contract 
also ensures social justice. In a free-market jurisdiction, 
each person is provided with equal opportunity to improve 
his position by making any contract according to his private 
will. Voluntary exchange is the basis of reciprocity and 
fairness since no one would enter a contract unless he 
regarded that what he receives is more valuable than what he 
gives away.84 
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The principle of freedom of contract also derives from 
utilitarian and economic conceptions aimed at ensuring the 
total happiness or wealth in society to the maximum 
extent.85 The rule of supply and demand brings about an 
optimal allocation of resources precisely when individuals 
seek their own utility and wealth. A voluntary exchange 
implies that, for each contracting party, the worth of what 
he receives is greater than the worth he parts with. In this 
way, resources are transferred to the people who value them 
the most, and utility derived from them is thereby 
increased. Contract Law enables the parties to rely on 
promises for future performance when immediate and 
simultaneous exchange would be impracticable or less 
profitable. Thus, consequential considerations of efficiency 
also support the respect for individual will, as manifested 
in voluntary contracts.86 
According to these views, the starting point regarding 
the content of a contract is the parties’ intentions and 
wills. 87 Absent a clearly expressed intention, one should 
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examine whether the parties’ intentions may be deduced from 
the contract language, the circumstances of its making, or 
previous dealing between the parties. Reference to trade 
usages or to statutory or judicial default rules as gap-
filling rules is made when attempts to reveal the actual 
intention of the parties has failed.88 Furthermore, even 
default rules are considered as “implied terms”, deriving 
their force from the parties’ presumed or hypothetical 
intention.89 Therefore, it is natural to place the general 
principles of contract law -- the principle of good faith 
and reasonableness at the bottom of the hierarchy which 
begins with the realization of the parties’ actual 
intention. 
1.2 Zamir’s Inverted Hierarchy of Gap-Filling Rules 
Professor Zamir proposed that the conventional 
hierarchy of gap-filling rules should be inverted.  In the 
reality, there is no clear borderline between the various 
sources in conventional hierarchy even though it seems well-
                                                             
85(3d ed. 1961): “The guiding principle, polestar or 
lodestar of interpretation, whatever the form or nature of 
the instrument, is always the same: to ascertain the will, 
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theory which was then dominant. See Tome II, 1 Henry Mazeaud 
et al., Lecons de Droit Civil, 319-21(8th ed. 1991). 
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ordered and supported by the existing laws.90 For example, 
the standard the law usually provides in default rules to 
fill the gap is “reasonableness”,91 and most usages of trade 
have been formed in the long-run practices based on the 
understanding of reasonableness. When courts fill gaps in 
the contract, they frequently resort to several sources 
simultaneously.92  
Professor Zamir’s argument is made on three levels. 
First, legal principles and judicial practice reveal that 
the courts actually prefer the inverted hierarchy. When 
filling gaps, courts always prefer values of fairness and 
justice to the actual intentions of the parties. Courts fill 
gaps so as to give contracts a reasonable, lawful, and fair 
meaning, a meaning in favor of the public, a meaning that 
promotes equality between the parties, serves efficiency in 
the society, and enhances the fairness in the society. In 
some circumstances, courts creatively resolve the problem of 
gap-filling in order to achieve the above goal.93 Moreover, 
gap-filling rules do not focus only on revealing the actual 
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and private intentions of the parties. Rather, they reflect 
distinctively public policies.94 
Second, the parties’ behavior reflects that they try to 
stick to the default rules and usages applicable to their 
transactions. There are many reasons for the contracting 
parties refrain from contracting out of default rules: legal 
rules usually reflect the prevailing preferences of 
contracting parties; contracting parties can reduce 
transaction cost if they do not deviate from the general 
usages and default rules applicable to their transaction; 
many parties feel secure when they know their agreements is 
in keeping with the default rules or the general usages; 
contracting parties fear mistakes resulting from incomplete 
drafting of terms or their misinterpretation by the courts. 
Even when the formal contract does deviate from the legal 
rules and general usages, parties usually perform their 
contractual duties in good faith and in accordance with the 
rules of fair dealing, default rules, and general usages. 95 
Finally, the inverted hierarchy is ethically superior 
to the conventional one. Based on the empirical research, 
the actual intentions of the parties at the time of 
contracting and performance are more in conformity with 
general standards of fair dealing and general usages than 
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with the conventional hierarchy.96 The inverted hierarchy is 
supported by the modern idea that contract law should 
enhance fairness and equivalence in exchange, realize 
redistributive goals, and implement paternalistic 
policies.97 Consideration of economic efficiency also 
supports the inverted hierarchy, considering that market 
failures and considerable transaction costs are prevalent 
phenomena in most markets, the limitations of cognitive 
faculties on one hand and people’s moral and social 
capabilities exist in contracting processes on the other 
hand.98 
 
2. The Theory of Penalty Default Rules 
Professor Ian Ayers and Robert Gertner have proposed 
the theory of penalty default rules.99 This theory reveals, 
in some circumstances, a party may choose to leave a gap in 
bad faith. The scholars indicate that the lawmaker or 
courts, in order to encourage the parties not to leave “bad 
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faith” gap in their contract, should sometimes impose 
penalty default rules.100 
2.1. Two Reasons for Contractual Gaps 
The theory of penalty default rules bases its theory on 
studying the reasons for the gaps. One reason the contract 
has gaps is the cost of contracting. In some cases, the 
transaction costs of explicitly contracting for given 
contingencies may be greater than the benefits.101 Many of 
those contingencies are better left open in the hopes that 
they will not happen or can be settled through negotiation 
when they do happen. These considerations may lead one or 
both parties keep silent as to a particular issue.102 By 
keeping silent, the parties can reduce their transaction 
costs including legal fees, negotiations costs, drafting and 
printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and 
probability of a contingency, and the costs to the parties 
and the courts of verifying whether a contingency occurred. 
Sometimes even though the transaction costs are quite low, 
but the probability of a contingency is much lower, the 
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rational party may choose to remain silent to such a 
contingency.103 For example, no one would be willing to 
discuss the problems such as “what if the Third World War 
happens?” when they negotiated their contract. In this case, 
the default rules will come to fill the term left by the 
parties when the contingency materializes or the parties 
cannot reach an agreement on the materialized contingency. 
The default rules can efficiently minimize the transaction 
costs by providing binding terms in the absence of consent. 
Another reason for contractual gap is called 
“strategic” gap104 or “bad faith” gap. Only one party might 
be more informed as to the background of the contract 
conditions or the default rules. He might choose to conceal 
that information in order to increase his private share of 
the gains from the contracting. In the employment-at-will 
contract, for instance, the employee might be ignorant of 
that, under the traditional employment-at-will rule, their 
contract can be terminated by either party at any time for 
any reason or for no reason. The informed employer might 
choose to conceal this information to the at-will employee, 
so that he could hire the employee with an ordinary salary 
for a higher risk employment relationship. This “strategic 
gap” is the focus of the analysis of the penalty default 
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rules. The scholars propose that lawmakers can reduce this 
strategic behavior by discouraging the concealment of 
information, therefore reduce the opportunities for this 
rent-seeking, “bad faith” behavior.  
Although the term “penalty default rules” is new, rules 
of this type can be found in earlier England common law.105 
Those default rules were formed based on the understanding 
of reasonableness. 
2.2 Examples of Penalty Default Rules 
2.2.1 Limit on the Lost Expectancy Damages 
Hadley v. Baxendale106 established the principle of 
limitation on the recovery of expectancy damages. It also is 
a good example of penalty default rule. In Hadley, the 
plaintiff operated a mill which was forced to suspend 
operations because of a broken shaft. An employee of the 
plaintiff took the shaft to the defendant carrier for 
shipment to another city for repairs. The carrier knew that 
the item to be carried was a shaft for the plaintiff’s mill, 
but was not told that the mill was closed because the shaft 
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was broken. The carrier negligently delayed delivery of the 
shaft, with the result that the mill was closed for several 
more days than it would if the carrier had adequately 
performed the contract. The plaintiff sued for the profits 
they lost during those extra days. The court held that the 
plaintiff could not recover for the lost profit because the 
loss of profits was not disclosed as a damage which would 
follow from breach of the transportation contract.  
The holding in Hadley is a penalty default rule. The 
miller plaintiff could have informed the carrier defendant 
of the potential consequential damages and contracted for 
full damage insurance. Then the informed carrier defendant 
might have been in a better position to prevent the 
potential loss. If the miller plaintiff had informed the 
carrier, the carrier would have been able to prevent the 
loss more efficiently because he could foresee the loss. At 
the same time, however, informing the carrier of the 
potential consequent damages would undoubtedly increase the 
price of shipping. In a competitive industry, the uninformed 
carrier, in effect, assumes he was facing an average-damage 
miller and charges a price accordingly. Therefore, the 
miller with above-average risk could reduce his high 
transportation cost by withholding strategically the 
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potential consequent damages in the hope that they would not 
happen.107 
Hadley stands for the principle that “if a risk of loss 
is known to only one party to the contract, the other party 
is not liable for the loss of it occurs.”108 This principle 
encourages the party with knowledge of the risk either to 
take effective precaution or reveal the risk to the less 
informed party. 
Hadley also indicates that good faith and 
reasonableness should apply to the “bad faith” gap. When the 
informed party withholds information in bad faith and 
thereby cause “bad faith” gap, courts, to promote the 
production of the information, should choose a default rule 
that reflect the reasonable expectation of the less informed 
party. For example, in Hadley, the less informed carrier’s 
reasonable expectation was that he was facing an average-
damage miller. 
2.2.2 Employment-At-Will Rule 
A gap in an employment-at-will contract is the 
termination term of employment. The traditional common law 
rule of employment-at-will contract is that the employer or 
employee may terminate an employment-at-will contract at any 
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time for any reason or for no reason. However, in recent 
years, most courts recognize some limitations on the 
employer’s ability to terminate the employment of the at-
will employee. One of the reasons the scholars advocate this 
department from the traditional rule is that the employees 
go into the job search and negotiation with inaccurate 
information while the employers start with much greater 
power and much more information regarding at-will rules.109  
According to one survey,110 there is striking level of 
misunderstanding of the most basic legal rules governing 
employment relationship.111 The employees consistently 
overestimate the degree of job protection afforded by law, 
believing that employees have far greater rights not to be 
fired without good cause than they in fact have.112 For 
example, “overwhelming majorities of the respondents 
erroneously believed that an employer cannot legally fire an 
employee in order to hire someone else at a lower wage, for 
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reporting internal wrongdoing by another employee.113 The 
survey indicated employers have less or mis-information 
about the legal effect of employment-at-will rule. Their 
expectations in employment-at-will are far away from the 
traditional employment-at-will rules. Meanwhile, the full-
informed employers might choose not to reveal the 
information to their at-will employees in order to have a 
higher risk employment relationship with an ordinary cost. 
In such circumstance, the employees have some reasonable 
expectations as to the job security while entering into 
employment contract. Meanwhile, the employers’ intentions 
are specific and real, and supported by the traditional 
default rule. What should be used to fill the gap of 
termination term?  The question is whether these “bad faith” 
intentions should be protected. The modern trend is, in such 
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circumstance, the principle of good faith and reasonableness 
prevails.114 
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 See e.g. Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation 
of Contractual Relations, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 617 (1983); 
Lorraine K. Phillips, The Legal Chokehold: Professional 
Employment in Ohio under the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 24 
Akron L. Rev. 581 (1991); Anthony W. Livoti, Court of 
Appeals Recognizes Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Employment Contract, 48 S. 
C. L. Rev. 123 (1996); Frank Vickory, the Erosion of the 
Employment-At-Will Doctrine and the Statute of Frauds: Time 
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CHAPTER V 
                            
GAP-FILLING AS FAIRNESS: LEADING OPINIONS 
 
1. Wood Case: Classic Illustration of Implied Good 
Faith Clause in the Field of Gap-Filling 
In Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff-Gordon,115 the defendant, 
Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, was a fashion designer. She made an 
agreement with the plaintiff, a businessman, whereby the 
latter was to have the right to place the Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon endorsement on fashion designs. Lucy agreed that the 
plaintiff would be the only person to have this right, and 
the plaintiff agreed to give Lucy one-half of any profits 
derived from the sales of such endorsed designs. Lucy then 
put her endorsement on the designs of third persons (without 
sharing the profits with plaintiff) and plaintiff sued for 
breach of the agreement. Lucy asserted that the contract 
failed for lack of consideration, on the ground that the 
plaintiff did not bind himself to do anything, since he was 
not obligated under the contract to sell any endorsed 
designs at all. In this case, the contract was silent to the 
plaintiff’s consideration. Even though the plaintiff had not 
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expressly promised to do anything, Judge Cardozo found an 
implied obligation on the plaintiff’s part to use reasonable 
efforts, reasoning that Lucy would not otherwise have given 
the plaintiff an exclusive right in which her only 
compensation was half the profits. This implied obligation 
was a sufficient “detriment” to the plaintiff to constitute 
consideration for Lucy’s counter-promise that she would not 
place her endorsement upon anyone else’s designs. Therefore, 
the contract was binding, and Lucy had breached it. In its 
decision, Judge Cardozo expressed his concern was the 
judicial need to balance freedom of contract with other 
social values. 
“We are not to suppose that one party was to be placed 
at the mercy of the other .... The implication [of language 
in the agreement] is that the [plaintiff’s] business 
organization will be used for the purpose for which it is 
adapted. But the terms of the [defendant’s] compensation are 
even more significant. Her sole compensation for the grant 
of an exclusive agency is to be one-half of all the profits 
resulting from the [plaintiff’s] efforts. Unless he gave his 
efforts, she could never get anything. Without an implied 
promise, the transaction cannot have such business “efficacy 
as both parties must have intended that at all events it 
should have.”116 
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 Wood, supra note 115, at 214-15. 
 55
In Wood, by emphasizing the necessity to achieve the 
business efficacy of the transaction, Judge Cardozo 
underscored the role of freedom of contract.117 To achieve 
the balance between freedom of contract and social order in 
Wood, he found an implied promise by the plaintiff to use 
reasonable efforts. Judge Cardozo stated that, “a promise 
may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be ‘instinct 
with an obligation,’ imperfectly expressed.”118 
The Wood opinion may be seen as a common-law attempt to 
protect the reasonable expectations of contracting parties 
with the principle of good faith and reasonableness while 
those expectations are contractual gaps. It reflected the 
court’s willingness to harmonize the value of private 
preferences and the need for social control. In order to 
achieve the contractual justice, the court found there was a 
gap in the contractual provisions and creatively filled the 
gap with the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
Moreover, Judge Cardozo’s “instinct language” opinion 
provided a rationale for the courts to do what they believed 
they were supposed to do, that is, enforce the parties’ 
intention when they were “imperfectly expressed.” As a 
matter of fact, “instinct language” opinion provide the 
courts a tool when they supply a missing term according to 
                     
117
 See Wood, supra note 115, at 214. 
118
 Id. at 214. 
 56
their understanding of reasonableness and fairness. It is 
another expression of reasonable expectations. It 
camouflaged the court’s flexibility by claiming the 
obligation filled by the courts arose “naturally” from the 
environment.119 
On the other hand, the Wood opinion reflected the 
evolution of contractual relationships required by a 
changing society. In response to the changing circumstances 
earlier in this century, courts began more directly to use 
the principle of good faith and reasonableness to support 
their decisions.120  
 
2. Orange and Rockland Utility Inc. v. Amerada Hess 
Corp.  
In Orange and Rockland Utilities Inc. v. Amerada Hess 
Corp.,121 the plaintiff, a utility, signed a contract with 
the defendant, an oil company, under which the defendant was 
to supply the plaintiff’s oil requirements for running a 
generating plant at a fixed price for four years. The 
contract contained an estimate for each year’s consumption. 
The estimate assumed that gas, not oil, would be used for 
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most of the plant’s fuel generation. Soon after the contract 
began, the prices of oil and gas climbed sharply. Within one 
year and 4 months of the execution of the contract, the 
lowest market price was more than double the price fixed in 
the requirements contract. The plaintiff began burning much 
less gas and much more oil than called for in the estimate, 
and sold the leftover gas to third parties for a substantial 
profit. In fact, the plaintiff eventually used oil more than 
twice the contract estimate. The plaintiff sued when the 
defendant refused to supply any more oil than the contract 
estimate plus 10%.122  
The court held that the UCC § 2-306(1) applied to the 
contract and a good deal of pre-code case law required “good 
faith” in the requirements contract. “It is well settled 
that a buyer in a rising market cannot use the fixed price 
in a requirements contract for speculation ....”123 As the 
requirements contract insured a steady flow of cheap oil 
despite swiftly rising prices, the plaintiff’s costs of 
producing electricity with oil would have been lower than 
those on the open market. Therefore, by using the contract 
and changing the mix of gas and oil, then propelling itself 
suddenly and dramatically into the position of a large 
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seller of power to the third parties, the plaintiff was 
acting in bad faith.124 Even apart from the bad faith issue, 
The plaintiff’s demand for more than double its contract 
estimate was “unreasonably disproportionate to [the] stated 
estimates.”125  
In its decision, the court stated that the unreasonably 
disproportionate standard must depend upon the reasonable 
expectations of the parties rather than be expressed as a 
fixed quantity. The court held that, under the facts of this 
case, requirements in excess of two times of the estimate 
were unreasonably disproportionate as a matter of law, but 
the court stated that this factor was not an inflexible 
measure. Rather, the determination was based on the 
following events: first, that the plaintiff’s requirements 
were more than double the estimate; second, that the seller 
could not anticipate this increase; third, that the market 
price for oil doubled; fourth, that the increase was due to 
sales to other utilities which the court characterized as an 
arbitrary change in conditions to take advantage of market 
conditions at the seller’s expense, and a net shift in 
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consumption from gas to oil which the buyer failed to 
explain.126 
The court held that the reasonableness standard was not  
an inflexible measure. It must be decided in the specific 
environment of contracting. Reasonableness standard was used 
as a specific tool to make ad hoc determinations of fairness 
and justice, and therefore to disallow the plaintiff’s 
requirements where justice requires.127  
 
3. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. 
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 128 a former 
salesman brought action against former employer to recover a 
commission on a sale due to him while he was employed by the 
former employer. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant 
under a written “salesman’s contract” which was terminable 
at will by either party on written notice. Under the 
employment contract, the plaintiff would receive a weekly 
salary in a fixed amount plus a bonus for sales made within 
his “territory” (i.e. customer accounts or stores). The 
contract indicated that the bonus credit would be paid only 
for an eighteen-month period following the date of the 
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order. In  1968, the plaintiff’s territory included First 
National which had been part of his territory for the 
preceding six years, and from which he had been successful 
in obtaining several orders. On November 29, 1968, First 
National signed an $5,000, 000 order, on which the amount of 
bonus credit was $92,079.99. On December 2, 1968 (the next 
business day), a termination notice issued from the 
defendant to the plaintiff. After that, the plaintiff 
remained to work for the defendant as a “sales support” and 
received 75% of the applicable bonus due on the sale. On 
June of 1970, approximately eighteen months after receiving 
the termination notice, the plaintiff was fired after he 
refused the retirement proposal from the defendant.129 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that 
because the salesman’s contract was at-will contract, 
through a literal reading of the contract, the employer is 
correct to terminate its employee. However, “good faith and 
fair dealing between the parties are pervasive requirement 
in our law, it can be said fairly that parties to contracts 
or commercial transactions are bound by this standard.”130 
The court believed that good faith is implied in contracts 
terminable at will by reference to recent decisions in other 
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jurisdiction.131 In this case, the defendant sought to 
deprive the plaintiff of all compensation by terminating 
twenty-five-year employment relationship with the plaintiff 
when the plaintiff was on the brink of successfully 
completing the sale. The defendant acted in bad faith. A 
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permit him to operate his business efficiently and 
profitably.” 
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termination made in bad faith constituted a breach of 
contract.132 This case indicated the court’s willingness not 
only in giving priority to the principle of good faith and 
reasonableness, but also in using this principle to modify 
the existing default rules based on the standard of 
reasonableness and fairness.  
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CHAPTER VI 
                            
 CONCLUSION 
 
The core of the contract is its content. The evolution 
of the gap-filing rules shows that the good faith and 
reasonableness plays more and more important role in this 
field. At the beginning, the courts refused to make the 
contract for the party. Then the courts tried to find out 
the actual intention of the parties, which sometimes proved 
rather difficult or even impossible. In order to support the 
freedom to make contracts without specifying all of the 
details of the relationship, the courts eventually turned to 
the “reasonable intention” standard in the field of gap-
filling. Initially objective gap filling was a means of 
allowing enforcement of agreements which the parties 
intended to be binding as in Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff-Gordon. 
But now it has become a mechanism for adding content to an 
agreement which would not be have been consented to by one 
of the parties as in Fortune v. National Cash Register. 
Of course, the courts still claim that they are protecting 
the freedom of contract. 
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Examining the totality of the law provisions, it is not 
difficult to indicate what the law prefers to fill the gap 
first. The CISG, as an international convention, clearly 
provides the reasonableness is the first source to fill the 
contractual gap, and after that is “all relevant 
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any 
practices which parties have established between themselves, 
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties”.133 That is 
a good evidence that the law places the principle of good 
faith and reasonableness at the top of the gap-filling 
rules. The Restatement (Second) clearly provides that the 
standard of gap-filling is reasonableness134, which is known 
as “what the parties would have agreed to if the question 
had been brought to their attention,”135 or what was the 
reasonable expectation the parties should have under this 
circumstance. Even if the UCC does not have such a clear 
provision on the face, a more careful reader will come to 
the conclusion that the essence of the law prefers to give 
the contract a reasonable meaning. 
 
1. Good Faith and Reasonableness May Reflect Intentions 
at the Time of Contracting 
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At one level, filling gaps based on good faith and 
reasonableness can be defended as effectuating what ordinary 
parties intend and as therefore consistent with freedom of 
contract. At the time of contracting the parties recognize 
that they are leaving gaps and at that point they ordinarily 
expect – one could say that they empower – the courts to 
fill the gaps using good faith and reasonableness as 
standard. Of course, not all parties have the intend to give 
this power to the courts. An employer insisting on an at-
will employment contract may not. But many will. 
Research reveals that, when the parties make a 
contract, they usually focus on only a few contractual terms 
they think essential, and ignore the other terms in the hope 
that they are reasonable terms.136 In many cases, the 
contract document is drafted by lawyers in legal language, 
using terminology that laymen - consumers and merchants 
alike - do not fully understand.137 In the case of standard 
form contracts, customers frequently do not bother to read 
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most of the provisions of the contract, focusing instead on 
a few essential issues such as price and time of delivery.138 
This phenomenon is also prevalent in cases where the formal 
contract is not drafted by either of the parties, but rather 
copied from existing forms originally drafted by lawyers. 
Even when the parties themselves drafted an agreement, they 
often use legal language, unaware of their exact meaning. 
In all of these cases, each party acts according to 
considerations and incentives of various kinds, these 
consist of short- and long-run self interest, including the 
expectation of reciprocity and the wish to enhance one’s 
good reputation, moral notions of the obligation to keep 
one’s promises and to make allowances for others, and the 
wish to attain social recognition and respect.139 Mutual 
reliance, expectations, and commitments exist prior to the 
signing of the formal contract and continue to develop and 
change afterwards. Of course, each party expects similar 
treatment from the other party. Above all, the parties 
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expect each other to behave fairly and reasonably, according 
to the principle of good faith. For instance, the buyer may 
expect seller to warrant the quality of goods and deliver 
them within a reasonable time even if they are not familiar 
with the relevant provisions of the UCC, even unaware of the 
existence of the UCC. “Being a reasonable person” is not 
only required by the law, but also expected by the parties. 
This conclusion is particularly applicable to the contract 
in modern times. As the contract relationship imports a good 
deal of standard form contracts, the transaction becomes 
more complicated, and the parties’ performances become more 
extended,140 the ordinary parties have to rely on the their 
opposite parties'  "good faith" and "reasonableness" to make 
a reasonable contract. 
 
2. Eventual Judicial Specification of Duties May Be 
Inconsistent with What a Party Intended 
When one gets to the point of how the courts actually 
fill gaps, then it becomes apparent that the courts may at 
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times impose provisions in a way that is inconsistent with 
traditional notion of freedom of contract.  
The moral force behind contract as promise is autonomy: 
the parties are bound to their contract because they have 
chosen to be. For this reason, freedom of contract has been 
the central principle of contract law. With the development 
of gap-filling rules, the content of a contract rests with 
not only the promises the parties have made, but also the 
external sources such as good faith, reasonableness, and 
social justice. As a result, some “surprising” duties may be 
imposed on the parties. Realistically speaking those duties 
may be inconsistent with the actual intentions of the 
parties. An employer’s intention to sign an at-will 
employment contract may be that he can terminate his 
employee at any time. A buyer entering into a requirements 
contract may want to have free choice of the quantity 
without assuming any duties. The developed gap-filling rules 
limit those free choices, thereby circumscribe the freedom 
of the parties in their contracts. The general understanding 
is that we have less freedom of contract than we had 
before.141 
Professor Fried suggested an explanation to this “less 
freedom” situation. According to Professor Fried, “contracts 
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generally are a device for allocating risks.”142 When the 
parties to a contract leave a gap in the contract, the court 
should apply the principle of sharing to fill the gap, that 
is, allocate loss and gain based on reasonableness.143 
Because the parties to the contract become closer through 
entering a contract relation, they have some obligation to 
share unexpected benefits and losses in the course of 
performing the contract. When the actual intentions of the 
parties are missing, the courts respect the freedom of the 
parties so far as possible by construing an allocation of 
burden and benefits that reasonable persons would have made 
in this kind of transaction.144  
In this century or even earlier,145 the principle of 
freedom of contract has experienced  “quite revolution” in 
response to the change in the societal conditions. Our 
society has experienced the dramatic transition from simple 
markets, characterized by face-to-face dealing and relative 
stability, to complex commercial society, impersonal 
economic exchange, greater uncertainty, and market 
volatility. In the process of this transition, standard form 
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contracts become predominant in many areas of trade and 
commerce, large monopolistic companies emerge, products 
become more and more complicated to ordinary consumers. 
These factors completely changed the balance of power in 
negotiations. Based on the changed societal conditions, 
people realized that the law, in granting freedom of 
contract, did not guarantee that all the member of the 
society would be able to utilize it to the same extent.146 On 
the contrary, the law, by protecting the unequal 
distribution of property, does not prevent freedom of 
contract from being a one-side privilege. For instance, by 
guaranteeing that it will not interfere with the exercise of 
power by contract, law has enable many an enterprise to 
legislate by contract in a substantially authoritarian 
manner. In this sense, the principle of freedom of contract 
as a justification for allowing one party to impose whatever 
terms it likes, even when the other party was not reasonably 
expected to read or understand those terms, is to apply the 
nominal “freedom” to what is essentially a license to 
defraud or, at least to mislead. "Unlimited freedom of 
contract, like unlimited freedom in other direction, does 
not necessarily lead to public or individual welfare."147 It 
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has been realized that contracting would be accorded the 
protections associated with freedom only when the parties 
engage in an honest effort to express what they both 
reasonably expect. Therefore, law attempts to protect the 
weaker contracting party against abuses of freedom of 
contract, for instance, by fixing minimum wages and maximum 
hours in employment, attempting to outlaw discrimination 
against union members and attempting to give special 
protection to the consumer. In this “silent revolution”, 
fairness has increasingly been accepted as a major principle 
of contract law.148 Moreover, freedom of contract has never 
been considered as an unlimited right to have whatever 
content the parties want.  Even in the past two hundred 
years, in which the freedom of contract has been of ensuring 
the voluntariness of the contract process while not 
interfere what its outcome, the doctrine of fraud, 
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and mistake have 
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 Twentieth century contract law has exhibited a 
willingness to imply reasonable terms not intended by the 
parties. Contract law has become, at least partially, to 
reflect what society believes is fair. The important 
jurisprudential result is that contract has moved from the 
domain of purely private law to a quasi-public law. The 
reasonable person has become its unelected constable. 
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frequently been used to police the fairness of transactions 
between parties.  
Contract law is an evolution process and the rules and 
principles of contract law have been changing in response to 
the changing condition. As a part of our changing 
civilization, legal principles represent the prevailing 
mores of the times.149  In the evolution process of the law, 
the meaning of freedom of contract, of course, has been 
changing in response to the changing societal situations. In 
modern times, the principle of freedom of contract requires 
the parties make a lawful and reasonable arrangement while 
they enjoy their freedom. Meanwhile, the judicial process of 
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recognizing and developing “gap-filling rules” produces 
rules that conform to prevailing conception of what is just, 
reasonable and efficient in contractual relationship.  
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